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lobalisation is being blamed for the 
squeezing of the middle class and 
protectionism is being offered as a 
solution. We argue in this paper that the increase 
in inequality is a long-term trend resulting from a 
variety of factors, including the decline in 
manufacturing, the reduction in the progressivity 
of taxation and the steady increase in asset prices, 
and that globalisation has only had a marginal 
impact on it. Protectionism will not reverse any of 
these trends. We discuss some policy options 
aimed at cushioning this increase in inequality 
and argue that they will likely result in expanding 
fiscal deficits and pressure on central banks to 
test the limits of growth.  
 
Introduction 
“In a democratic society, such a stark bifurcation of 
wealth and income trends among large segments of 
the population can fuel resentment and political 
polarisation. These social developments can lead to 
political clashes and misguided economic policies 
that work to the detriment of the economy and society 
as a whole.” – Alan Greenspan, July 2005 
Alan Greenspan made his name as an economic 
forecaster, but he is also known to have an acute 
sense of emerging political trends. One of the hotly 
debated topics on both sides of the Atlantic is how 
the recent economic expansion has ignored the 
middle class and how globalisation is squeezing the 
average worker. In the United States it featured 
prominently during the recent mid-term election 
campaigns, and the replacement of John Snow as 
Treasury Secretary in mid-2006 was, in fact, 
motivated by the perceived need of the Bush 
Administration to better communicate the success of 
its economic policies, as polls were consistently 
showing voters’ dissatisfaction with the economy 
despite strong economic growth. It is thus not 
surprising that the first measure to be implemented 
by the recently elected Democratic Congress, in an 
attempt to lift overall wages, will be an increase in 
the national minimum wage, which has not changed 
since 1997 and, adjusted for inflation, is the lowest of 
the last 50 years. In Europe, German trade unions 
recently announced that the 2007 wage round will be 
aimed at ensuring that workers get a fair share of 
economic growth after many years of wage 
moderation. In Japan, concern about the weakness of 
household income is starting to feature prominently 
in the political discussion and even the Bank of Japan 
has discussed income inequality in its deliberations.  
The debate can quickly become polarised, as 
Greenspan hinted, and the risk of selective and 
narrow analysis to support specific political agendas 
is high. The truth of the matter is that the economic 
stagnation of the middle class is clearly apparent in 
the data, and not limited to the US. The wage share 
of national income of the developed world is at the 
lowest point since the mid-1970s, and this process 
has accelerated in the last few years. In fact, real 
wages have been stagnant since 2000 despite strong 
growth and robust productivity gains while profits are 
capturing a record share of GDP. 
Secular trends and globalisation  
Globalisation is a reality. Production is being shifted 
around the globe, and millions of people are being 
affected, positively and negatively. But before 
jumping to the conclusion that globalisation is the 
source of this sharp divergence in income trends, it is 
important to put these dynamics in a secular 
perspective. A useful source is Atkinson & Piketty 
(2006), who study changes in inequality over the last 
century by analysing the evolution of the top income 
shares in a variety of countries. Economic theory 
suggests that inequality would follow an inverted U-
shape: gains from technological progress would 
initially accrue to the wealthy and raise inequality, to 
then stabilise and eventually benefit the middle and 
lower classes as more workers have access to the new 
technologies. In fact, the industrial revolution led to 
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an increase in inequality that lasted until WWII, 
when it declined sharply and stabilised at a lower 
level, completing the inverted-U. The process started 
again in the mid-1970s, and since then real median 
family income has increased by about 15%, 
compared to a growth rate of about 100% for the top 
1% of the income distribution. The inverted-U is 
recreating itself and inequality is now at levels 
similar to pre-war levels – to wit: the share of income 
flowing to 0.1% of Americans has recently reached 
7%, the highest since the 1920s – but with an 
important difference: the rich in the pre-war period 
were mostly capitalists, i.e. owners of capital, while 
the rich of the post-1970 period are mostly high-wage 
earners.  
The inflexion point in inequality the mid-1970s seems 
to coincide with the peak in the share of 
manufacturing in GDP – as the move towards 
services allows for wider wage dispersion – and with 
the beginning of a steady decline in the progressivity 
of taxation. The OECD’s share of manufacturing in 
GDP has more than halved over the last 25 years. 
Income tax systems have become flatter; the 
maximum marginal tax rate has declined over 20 
points for the OECD average, halving the difference 
between the maximum marginal rate and the standard 
rate.
1  
Overlaying these two trends, the global economy has 
recently been buffeted by two shocks: on the one 
hand, the ‘globalisation’ shock, the combination of 
the IT revolution, the doubling of the global labour 
force as the former Soviet Union, China, India and 
other emerging markets have entered the global 
supply chain (adding about 1.5 billion workers) and 
the lowering of barriers to trade and FDI across the 
globe. On the other hand, the reaction to the Asian 
crisis (increase in savings and in foreign exchange 
reserves in Asia) and to the burst of the investment 
bubble (decline in investment in the OECD), which 
has lowered real interest rates.
2 What are the 
implications of these two shocks? Three stand out: a 
lowering of the price of labour with respect to capital 
(as the supply of labour has increased), and an 
increase in the return on capital (as capital embodied 
technological progress and an increase in the mobility 
of capital has improved its efficiency); and a steady 
increase in the price of assets as interest rates have 
declined. 
Who wins and who loses from this constellation of 
shocks? The winners are those whose income is more 
linked to capital and assets, mainly the upper classes 
– who can afford to own a home and whose share 
                                                  
1 See Zee (2005) for an extensive discussion of the 
evolution of the taxation of personal income. 
2 See Gros et al. (2006) for a comprehensive discussion 
of these dynamics.  
ownership is significantly higher.
3  The losers are 
those whose income is more linked to wages. Since 
the main asset of the average worker is her human 
capital, and this at the margin has become more 
mobile and thus subject to global competitive 
pressures, workers of all skill levels are affected. 
Wages typically catch up with productivity gains, and 
probably global wages are following the 
improvement in global productivity growth, but the 
very wide differences in wage rates across countries 
– hourly compensation in Chinese manufacturing is 
still a mere 3% of industrial world levels – imply that 
this process of catching up with productivity gains 
could be very slow in the developed world. 
Importantly, and perhaps contrary to conventional 
wisdom, even the better educated workers have 
recently lost ground. Technological progress has 
exacerbated the trend towards offshoring of services 
and the computerisation of many lower value-added 
services has dramatically lowered the value of the 
average college education – as an example, real 
wages for bachelor degrees in the US have fallen 
almost 10% since 2000.
4 
However, despite the global nature of these shocks, 
the evolution of inequality has been different across 
countries. While the top income share has gained 
ground rapidly in the Anglo-Saxon countries, it has 
remained more stable in Europe or Japan. There are 
three potential reasons for this disparity: first, the 
wider development of stock options in Anglo-Saxon 
countries as a means of compensation – thus linking 
salaries more closely to the evolution of profits – has 
contributed to the explosion of earnings at the top of 
the income distribution;
5 second, the trend towards 
temporary and part-time employment, combined with 
sharp differences in social safety nets – in the US, the 
rise in part time/consultant employment that does not 
provide benefits has significantly lowered the 
purchasing power of average workers;
6 third, better 
financial development in Anglo-Saxon countries has 
allowed households to better reap the benefits from 
asset price appreciation.  
Overall, this discussion suggests that blaming 
globalisation for the squeezing of the middle class is 
a dangerous oversimplification.  The  discussion 
                                                  
3 Census data show that the upper decile owns over 10 
times more stocks than the remaining 90%. 
4 This is breaking the long-term trend: since the mid- 
1970s, real wages of college-educated workers have 
increased by over 20%, while those of workers with less 
than high school have declined by about 15%.  
5 It is unclear why this development is different across 
countries, but non-market mechanisms and social 
conventions may play a role in compensation decisions.  
6 And, in a perverse cycle, the skyrocketing cost of 
medical benefits is increasingly pushing companies 
towards temporary contracts.   
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suggests, first of all, that the widening of the income 
distribution is a long term process that started well 
before the ‘globalisation’ shock and that it is the 
result of multiple factors; and second that the key 
factors behind it are likely to be the declining 
progressivity of the tax system, the shifts in the 
composition of household income and the increase in 
asset prices, and the structure of the welfare system.  
What to do about it?  
Once the causes and roots of the squeeze are 
clarified, the question is what to do about it. It seems 
to be an empirical regularity that income inequality is 
positively correlated with growth, so it is a value 
judgment whether this situation should be corrected 
or not. Democratic societies have mechanisms to 
evaluate the preferences of their citizens and decide 
on policies to address them. But regardless of the 
judgment about the importance of inequality, what 
not to do about it is clear: protectionism should be 
avoided, because free trade and openness are 
unambiguously positive for global growth, and 
because openness is only one small factor 
contributing to the rising inequality. 
The optimal strategy is thus to improve the three 
factors we identified as the possible key sources of 
the problem, in order to maximise the trickle down 
from global growth into average welfare. Several 
ideas come to mind:  
•  Improve the link between household income 
and asset prices. This could be achieved by 
facilitating the access to asset ownership – for 
example, by fostering the development of deep 
and sophisticated mortgage markets that increase 
home ownership
7 or endowing each child with 
stocks at birth – by enabling the liquification of 
house prices gains – through cheaper and easier 
mortgage refinancing and mortgage equity 
withdrawal – and by rethinking the composition 
of pay packages and of pensions as regards their 
connection to overall economic profitability – for 
example, by offering stock options or variable 
bonuses to all workers. However, it is important 
to understand that, given that in Europe the 
phenomenon of stock options is not widespread 
and the earnings differences within companies 
are more compressed than in the US, increasing 
the linkage between pay and corporate 
profitability as a means of enhancing the 
trickling down from global growth would 
probably lead to an initial increase in inequality.
8 
                                                  
7 Fisher & Quayyum (2006) attribute a significant 
amount of the recent increase in home ownership in the 
US to improvements in the mortgage market.  
8 Related to this, Nicolas Sarkozy said that stock options 
should be for everybody or nobody. As the ‘superstar 
One should also understand that this higher 
sharing in profits and asset appreciation entails 
upside and downside risks.
9 For every Microsoft 
millionaire, there are hundreds of employees of 
failed technology companies who have seen their 
stock options expire worthless. In other words, 
the recent widening of the income distribution, 
since it is mainly due to the expansion of asset 
prices and return on capital, will likely be 
accompanied by higher risk and greater exposure 
to boom-bust cycles.  
•  Improve social policies to support those 
affected by the trend towards temporality and 
offshoring. This has different implications in 
different countries. In the US, where welfare 
benefits are essentially linked to having a job, the 
key is to increase the portability of benefits 
(health care and pension) to match the increased 
portability of jobs;
10 an obvious and cheaper 
alternative, developing a universal health care 
system, seems to be politically unfeasible.
11 In 
Europe, the key is to reform welfare systems in 
the direction of providing ample support for 
workers, not jobs, and a sharpening of incentives 
to encourage job-seeking, thus reducing the 
rigidities of labour markets. In a context of 
increased immigration and duality of labour 
markets, policies have to be oriented towards 
reducing the protection of the ‘insiders’ (those 
holding highly protected, permanent contracts) in 
order to reduce the precariousness of the 
‘outsiders’ (those holding part-time and 
temporary contracts, mainly the young and 
unskilled). Trade unions must understand that 
they cannot continue defending the privileges of 
the insiders at the expense of the outsiders. 
•  Increase the human capital of workers by 
enhancing investment in education and 
research. It is clear that growth models based on 
low-skilled work are not sustainable in the 
developed world. With wage differentials as 
wide as they are, countries that do not move up 
in the value-added ladder will suffer. Two issues 
are important in this regard. First, investment in 
                                                                             
model’ suggests and we argue here, this would lead to 
an initial increase in inequality.  
9 The sharp correction in inequality after WWII 
responded to the destruction of capital that resulted from 
the war and that affected mainly the richer classes.  
10 An interesting development in this regard is the 
Freelancers Union, which aims at providing benefits to 
the increasing share of free agent workers in the US.  
11 This is especially unfortunate because, as the US 
2005 census shows, the percentage of Americans with 
private health insurance has declined to a 20-year low. 
The recent policy proposals in Massachusetts, however, 
give some hope to this avenue.   
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education should be biased towards endowing the 
population with a robust and general educational 
base that allows citizens to master the skills 
needed to engage in continuous and creative 
learning. With technological change taking place 
at a fast pace, education that focuses on specific 
technical specialisation is bound to be inefficient, 
as the German model of professional training 
shows. Thus, when faced with competing 
demands for funds for education, policy-makers 
will be well advised to prioritise areas that 
provide a solid foundation for general training 
and maximise expected returns, such as early 
childhood education.
12 Second, it is important to 
understand that just increasing investment in 
R&D will not be enough, for most of the 
productivity growth stems from entry and 
expansion of more productive firms and the exit 
of the less productive, rather than by productivity 
increases in existing firms.
13 In this vein, trade 
openness becomes critical as it fosters product 
market liberalisation and amplifies the 
productivity-enhancing effects of investment in 
education and research by spurring the ‘creative 
destruction’ needed to benefit from innovations. 
This focus on higher-skilled activities and the 
increased mobility of labour implies, in addition, 
that reversing the secular trend towards less 
progressive taxation may be politically 
unfeasible; if anything, the trend seems to be 
towards simpler tax systems that reduce 
distortions in labour supply and where 
redistribution takes place on the spending side of 
the budget – raising further the critical need for 
an efficient welfare system.  
The corollary of these suggestions is that fiscal 
discipline may not be politically feasible and may not 
be a priority in the years ahead. An increase in the 
mobility of capital leads to global tax competition 
and puts a lid on tax increases while the combined 
spending demands for social networks, education and 
research, combined with the higher entitlement costs 
associated with an aging population, will make 
spending cuts very unpalatable for democratic 
societies where an increasingly bigger share feels left 
behind. In a world of ample savings, credible central 
banks and regional economic arrangements, long-
term interest rates are low and have become largely 
independent from fiscal discipline. As a result, 
progress in fiscal adjustment will likely be postponed 
while political systems discuss how to allocate their 
already-scarce resources,
14 and the combination of an 
aging population and income inequality will exert 
                                                  
12 See Carneiro & Heckman (2003). 
13 See, inter alia, Foster et al. (2001).  
14 The recent proposal by Jacques Chirac to offer tax 
breaks to companies who share with their employees the 
benefits of globalisation is a clear example of this.  
considerable pressure on central banks to deliver 
unanticipated inflation as a means to finance the 
competing social needs.  
Conclusion 
In sum, the income distribution has been widening 
over the last quarter of century and it has accelerated 
in recent years, but globalisation has only had a 
marginal impact on it. Technological progress, tax 
changes, asset price inflation and differences in 
compensation schemes are as important, if not more, 
than the offshoring of jobs to emerging markets. 
Globalisation is a positive development, and the rich 
world should embrace it as the channel through 
which the developing world can catch up with the 
developed world. Policies that smooth this transition 
and that soften the blow for average workers are 
certainly needed, but protectionism is certainly not 
one of them. Priority should be given to matching 
welfare systems to the new trends in employment to 
cushion the increased instability of jobs, and 
improving the access of average workers to asset 
ownership. Tough choices lie ahead, especially as the 
needed entitlement reform due to the aging of the 
population will probably lead to very difficult 
spending decisions that, likely, will result in higher 
deficits in the years ahead. As Alan Greenspan 
cautions in the quote opening this paper, the risk of 
adopting misguided policies at times of political 
clashes is high. This paper, by putting the widening 
inequality in a broader context, has tried to contribute 
to the reduction of such a risk.  
References 
Atkinson, Anthony and Thomas Piketty (2006), Top 
Incomes over the Twentieth Century, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Carneiro, Pedro and James Heckman (2003), “Human 
Capital Policy”, in Benjamin Friedman (ed.), 
Inequality in America: What role for Human Capital 
Policies, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Fisher, Jonas and Saad Quayyum (2006), “The Great 
Turn-of-the-Century Housing Boom”, Economic 
Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 
2006/Q3: 29-44.  
Foster, L., J. Haltiwanger and C.J. Krizan (2001), 
“Aggregate Productivity Growth: Lesson from 
Microeconomic Evidence”, in C.R. Hutten, E.R. 
Dean and M.J. Harper (eds), New Developments in 
Productivity Analysis, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Gros, Daniel, Thomas Mayer and Angel Ubide (2006), 
A World out of Balance, Report of the CEPS 
Macroeconomic Policy Group, Centre for European 
Policy Studies, Brussels.  
Zee, Howell H. (2005), Personal Income Tax Reform: 
Concepts, Issues, and Comparative Country 
Developments, IMF Working Paper WP/05/87, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. 